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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses firms’ characteristics that influence managers’ decisions 
about how to finance their companies. It also aims to study which financial theory better 
explains those decisions that affect the capital structure of the firms. Our empirical 
study uses panel data and Ordinary Least Squares estimations with cross-section fixed 
effects and year dummy variables. The sample includes 436 non-financial French firms, 
listed in the Paris Stock Exchange over the period from 2007 to 2013 (3052 firm-year 
observations). In the empirical study to test the results’ sensitivity to the use of debt 
with different maturities we use two regressions and hence two dependent variables: the 
total debt and the long term debt. The independent variables that we use are the 
tangibility of assets, the profitability, the firm size, the growth opportunities and the 
non-debt tax shields. All independent variables exhibit explanatory power and the 
results are robust to the use of debt with different maturities. The empirical results show 
that there is no leading theory in explaining managers’ decisions about how to finance 
firms. Additionally, the sample was divided into pre-crisis (2007-2008) and crisis 
(2009-2013) periods, the results show a substantial change of the influence of the 
tangibility of assets, as a result of the financial crisis. 
 
Keywords: capital structure, trade-off theory, pecking order theory, market timing 
theory, Euronext Paris 
 
JEL Codes: C33, G32 
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Resumo 
Este trabalho tem como principal objetivo estudar as características das empresas 
que influenciam as decisões dos gestores sobre como financiar as suas empresas. Outro 
dos objetivos deste estudo é perceber que teoria financeira melhor explica essas 
decisões que afetam a sua estrutura de capital das empresas. No nosso trabalho empírico 
utilizamos dados em painel e o método Ordinary Least Squares com efeitos fixos cross-
seccionais e variáveis dummy para os anos. A amostra inclui 436 empresas Francesas, 
não financeiras, listadas na bolsa de valores de Paris para o período entre 2007 e 2013 
(um total de 3052 observações empresa-ano). Para testar a sensibilidade dos resultados 
ao endividamento com diferentes maturidades, utilizamos duas regressões e 
consequentemente duas variáveis dependentes: o endividamento total e o endividamento 
de longo prazo. As variáveis independestes que utilizamos são a tangibilidade dos 
ativos, a rentabilidade, a dimensão da empresa, as oportunidades de crescimento e os 
benefícios fiscais não relacionados com o endividamento. Concluímos que os resultados 
são robustos ao uso das diferentes maturidades de envidamento. Todas as variáveis 
explicativas apresentam poder explicativo e os resultados empíricos denotam que das 
teorias abordadas nenhuma consegue explicar exaustivamente as decisões dos gestores 
no financiamento das suas empresas. Posteriormente, a amostra foi dividida entre o 
período pré-crise (2007-2008) e o período de crise (2009-2013), os resultados mostram 
uma mudança substancial do impacto da variável tangibilidade dos ativos, como 
resultado da crise financeira. 
 
Palavras-chave: estrutura de capitais, teoria trade-off, teoria pecking-order, teoria 
market timing, Euronext Paris 
 
Códigos JEL: C33, G32 
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1. Introduction 
Modern theory of capital structure starts with the Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
theorem stating that, under a number of specific assumptions, capital structure is 
irrelevant for both the cost of capital and firm value. The central assumptions of this 
theory are, for example, there are no taxes, no transaction costs and no bankruptcy costs 
in the economy.   
Under these assumptions the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem makes sense. 
But those propositions are unrealistic. Thus many other studies after this one argue that 
the capital structure, i.e., the choice between debt and equity, really influences the value 
of the firm. 
After the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), many other studies 
analyse this thematic using a less restrictive set of assumptions.  Models of trade-off 
study capital structure by balancing the benefits of taxes against the costs of financial 
distress, Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), and against agency costs, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). Another line of research argues that there is a pecking order among financing 
sources, Myers and Majluf (1984). Finally, a different body of literature, which is 
known as  market timing theory, suggests that firms issue shares when the market is 
high and repurchase their own shares when the market is low, Baker and Wurgler 
(2002).  
Since then, other studies have investigated what theory better explains the firms’ 
capital structure. For example Frank & Goyal (2009) identify a number of relevant 
factors underlying managers’ decisions about capital structure for a sample of US firms 
and investigate what theory better explains these decisions. In another work, Cortez & 
Susanto (2012) aim at finding the theory that better explains what factors influence 
financing decisions in Japanese Manufacturing Companies. Most of the extant literature 
found no evidence of a dominant theory in explaining the firms’ capital structure. 
The motivations for studying the capital structure, although this issue has been 
widely discussed, rely on the lack of consensus regarding the determinants of capital 
structure and about the theory underlying managers’ decisions.  In fact, the empirical 
results depend on the sample used and the period in analysis. Therefore, is important to 
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continue to investigate the firms’ characteristics that affect the managers’ decisions and 
develop a theory that could explain those decisions. 
Thus, the aim of this paper is understand which characteristics of non-financial 
listed firms affect the decisions taken by managers about how to finance their 
investments and projects (resort to internal or external funds and resort to short, medium 
or long term resources) and thus in this way affect the company capital structure. 
Another purpose of the paper is to investigate which theory among the three presented 
before (Trade-off theory, Pecking order theory or Market timing theory) better explains 
the capital structure of firms, given their characteristics. 
Initially the objective of this research was to study Portuguese firms, but given 
the small dimension of the Portuguese market we decided to analyse a market in the 
Eurozone with a higher number of firm-year observations. Thus, after testing several 
countries, we select France, because it is the country with the larger number of firm-
year observations in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Given the 
entire universe of French firms, we chose the subset of non-financial listed companies, 
so that their financial results and reporting disclosure can be compared with those of the 
listed companies in the other countries, namely in the European Union. 
Therefore, the sample is composed by 436 non-financial French firms, listed in 
the Paris Stock Exchange for the period since 2007 to 2013 (3052 firm-year 
observations). In the empirical study we use panel data and Ordinary Least Squares 
estimations with cross-section fixed effects and year dummy variables. 
This paper presents several contributions to the capital structure literature. Firstly, 
we use a different sample. In most of previous papers the country under study is the 
United States of America or the United Kingdom, since they are the most developed 
countries. Additionally, most recently, many studies analyse the developing countries in 
an attempt to compare their results with those obtained for developed countries. This 
background points to the importance of analysing a developed European country. We do 
not choose the entire European Union or a sample including more than one country 
because in previous literature has been developed the argument that countries’ specific 
factors can make comparability difficult. So we choose France, after analysing several 
European countries, because it was the one with the larger number of firm-year 
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observations in EMU. Additionally, we do not found any recent study about capital 
structure for this country. Thus this is a gap in the literature that we intend to fill with 
this work.  
Secondly, we contribute to the literature by examining a relatively long period of 
time (since 2007 to 2013), that allows to make relative comparisons not only with other 
countries but also over time. As it is known the world and, in particular, the European 
Union since 2008, faces an economic and financial crisis. With our sampling period we 
were able to investigate if the firms’ characteristics that affect managers’ decisions 
about how to finance the investments have changed after the financial crisis. We have to 
mention that we could not extend our sampling period before 2007 to ensure the 
uniformity of accounting standards (mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005).  
Thirdly, in our empirical process to test the models’ sensitivity to the use of debt 
with different maturities, we use two dependent variables, the total debt divided by the 
book value of assets and the long term debt divided by the book value of assets. 
Commonly we should use the long term debt as dependent variable but Cortez & 
Susanto (2012) conclude that some firms make heavier use of short term debt in their 
capital structure, so we decided to include the both type of debt.  
Finally, we introduce in our regression year dummy variables, instead of the 
estimation with fixed effects that the most previous works use. These year dummy 
variables evidence to be statistically significant and allow us to conclude that also the 
listed firms, in a big European market, were concerned to reduce the debt levels during 
the years since 2010 to 2013. The most likely explanation for this decrease is the 
financial and economic crisis. 
The results obtained by the empirical work show that there is no a leading theory 
that can explain the decisions taken by managers of the firms about how to finance its 
investments and projects. On the one side, the results show that the tangibility of assets 
and firm size have a positive impact in the firm leverage, as predicted by the Trade-off 
theory. On the other side, as stated by the Pecking order theory the profitability is 
negatively correlated with debt; and the firms’ growth opportunities is negatively 
correlated with leverage, consistent with the Market timing theory. When the sample is 
divided, to analyse the impact of financial and economic crisis in the capital structure of 
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the firms, we can highlight that before the crisis the variable tangibility presents a 
negative relation with debt and this relation changes to positive after the crisis. This 
represents the fact that, for lenders, especially after the financial crisis, tangible assets 
are considered as important collateral for their lending to firms. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 is made a brief 
literature review of the capital structure theories. In section 3 are presented the 
hypothesis developed, the variables used in the study, the sample and the methodology 
of the empirical work. The regressions results are discussed in the section 4. Finally, in 
section 5 are presented the conclusions of the study with the limitations of this work and 
suggestions for future researches. 
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2. Literature Review 
The optimal capital structure is one of the most debated subjects in corporate 
finance. The debate attempts to contribute to explain the financing sources used by 
enterprises to finance their investments (Myers, 2001). The capital structure may be 
defined as a combination between equity and debt (Akdal, 2010); the optimal capital 
structure would be the one that maximizes the firm’s value and minimize the weighted 
average cost of capital. 
Although it is one of the most discussed areas, we can say that there is no 
consensus in the literature. Myers (1984) argues that theories don’t explain the 
financing behaviour, and so, is presumptuous advising the firms about their optimal 
capital structure, when the literature is so far to be able to explain the actual decisions. 
The modern theory of capital structure starts with the Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) theorem stating that under a number of specific assumptions capital structure is 
irrelevant for both the cost of capital and the firm value, which imply that there is no 
optimal leverage ratio. 
In their point of view the amount and the level of debt does not affect the firm 
value under a number of specific assumptions: if there were no taxes and no transaction 
costs to borrow or lend; if there were no bankruptcy costs; if the agents could borrow or 
lend at the risk free rate; if the companies only emit two types of loans: with risk and 
without risk; if the corporate earnings were fully distribute to shareholders; if all cash 
flows were perpetual and constant and if all market participants anticipate the same 
results for companies’ operating results. In other words, the firms’ debt level does not 
affect their value if the financial markets are efficient and if there is symmetry of 
information (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). 
Gradually, Modigliani and Miller, and many other authors, like Robert Hamada, 
Merton Miller, Ross, Altman, Jensen, Meckling, for example, began to relax some of 
these assumptions and created their own theories about the capital structure. In first 
place they recognized that debt has a preferential treatment in the tax code, so the 
optimal capital structure would be more leveraged than what is expected. Secondly it 
was stated that although increasing debt levels means have more tax benefits, it also 
6 
 
means high probability of incurring in bankruptcy costs. And finally, it was recognized 
that there are asymmetric information in financial markets, between investors and 
managers (Pagano, 2005). 
With the relax of this and other assumptions emerged new theories about the 
optimal capital structure, like, for example, the trade-off theory, the pecking order 
theory and the market timing theory. 
The trade-off theory studies the capital structure by balancing the benefit of tax 
against the cost of financial distress, Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), and against agency 
costs, Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
In the perspective of Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) there are a level that 
maximizes the value market of the firm and this level is achieved with the trade-off 
between the tax benefits of debt and de financial distress. The firm has a target leverage 
ratio and move toward it, Myers (1984). In this perspective, the market value of an 
indebted enterprise should be equal to a market value of a not indebted company plus 
the present value of the difference between the tax advantages of debt and the 
bankruptcy costs (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973).  
In another trade-off perspective Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) 
focused on the agency costs derived from asymmetric information and different lines of 
interests. These authors were concerned with the conflicts of interests between 
shareholders and managers, and between managers and bondholders. The agency 
relationship is a contract where the principal delegate some decisions to the agent and 
this one agrees to follow the interests of the first one. The relationship between the 
shareholders and managers is a typically agency relationship (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).  
The agency costs result from the fact that the manager can make decisions and 
investments for their own interests. For Jensen (1986) the use of debt disciplines the 
managers’ actions, avoiding the use of free-cash flows in inadequate decisions. So the 
agency costs between managers and shareholders would be reduced with leverage. 
The agency costs between managers and bondholders appear when a firm invests 
in projects with higher risk or does not invest in projects with NPV>0. This problem can 
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be mitigated by limiting the leverage ratio of the firm or with the use of short-term debt 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Other line of research is the pecking order theory. This theory states that there is 
a pecking order among financing sources, if there are information asymmetries in the 
firm between insiders (shareholders and managers) and outsiders (investors), Myers and 
Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984). For the authors owing to information asymmetries 
between insiders and potential investors, firms will prefer retained earnings to debt, 
short-term debt over long-term debt, and debt over equity. This occurs because use 
equity under asymmetric information is more expensive, so in this case firms prefer 
issue debt to avoid selling under-priced securities. 
In the pecking order theory there is no target level of leverage, the attraction of 
interest tax shields and the threat of bankruptcy costs passed to background, Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999). For the authors the leverage ratio varies with the necessity of 
external funds. This explains why the most profitable firms are the ones that issue less 
debt and equity, this firms use their own retain earnings to finance their projects, Myers 
(2001). 
Unlike the pecking order theory, Frank and Goyal (2003) found that when the 
internal funds are not sufficient to finance investments and projects, firms resort to 
external funds, but, in this case, debt does not dominate financing through equity. 
Finally, we have the Baker & Wurgler (2002) theorem which states that the 
equity market timing is significant in corporate financial policy. The market timing 
theory is based on the assumption that a firm will used equity instead of debt when the 
market value is high, and will repurchase equity when market value is low (Baker & 
Wurgler, 2002). In this work, the authors conclude that market timing has a persistent 
and large impact in the firm capital structure. The main finding of Baker & Wurgler 
(2002) is that “low leverage firms are those that raised funds when their market 
valuations were high, as measured by the market-to-book ratio, while high leverage 
firms are those that raised funds when their market valuations were low”. 
Graham & Harvey (2001), in a CFOs survey about the cost of capital, the capital 
budgeting and the capital structure, concluded that for managers the stock valuation is 
very important when they consider the issue of equity. Two-thirds of the executives 
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think that theirs stocks are undervalued by the market and only 3% thinks that they are 
overvalued. Thus, the choice between debt and equity is also related with the 
managerial optimism (Heaton, 2000). 
As we mentioned above, the country chosen for the study is France. According to 
Daskalakis & Psillaki (2008) in this country bank loans are very important in the 
financial structure of the firms. In the empirical work, they concluded that there are a 
positive relation between size and debt in France, what means that larger firms seem to 
rely more on debt than smaller firms. They also find that assets structure and 
profitability are negatively correlated with debt, which is consistent with the pecking 
order theory. The authors also concluded that, in the case of French firms, and for the 
capital structure decisions, the company’ effects are more important than the country 
effects. Kouki & Said (2012) conclude that French firms adjust their debt levels based 
on the target ration explained by the follows variables: firm size, profitability, growth 
opportunities and non-debt tax shields. For them it seems that “the level of corporate 
debt is determined by the resolution of the mechanisms of trade-off between benefits 
and costs of debt while searching for an optimal debt ratio. Similarly, financial 
behaviour can be oriented in the light of assessments and evaluations of financing 
deficit. In this case, the theory of pecking order explains financial behaviour of French 
firms and would allow managers to better choose between debt and equity.” (Kouki & 
Said, 2012). 
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3. Research Design 
3.1 Hypothesis development 
Based on the assumptions and theories previously presented we formulate the 
research questions for our study. In the related literature, most authors state that the 
most relevant firm characteristics that affect the corporate leverage are namely the 
tangibility of assets, the profitability, the firm size, the growth opportunities and the 
non-debt tax shield. Many other firm characteristics have also been studied, but in many 
cases, the authors could not conclude about the relevance of such variables for 
explaining the capital structure of the firms.  
So, in this study are used the five characteristics referred above to analyse the 
capital structure. 
Tangibility of assets 
Most of the authors that analyse the determinants that affect the capital structure 
of the firms, state that the nature of assets affects their leverage level. In the perspective 
of the trade-off theory the firms that have more tangible assets tend to be more 
leveraged (Frank & Goyal, 2009). This can be justified because the tangible assets can 
be used to collateralize the loans, so the firms with more tangible assets tend to issue 
more debt (Titman & Wessels, 1988). For Rajan & Zingales (1995), who are in 
consensus with the authors mentioned above, the tangible assets retain more value in 
liquidation and decrease the agency cost of debt for lenders, so for the authors “the 
greater the proportion of tangible assets on the balance sheet (fixed assets divided by 
total assets), the more willing should lenders be to supply loan, and leverage should be 
higher”. 
In the pecking order theory perspective, managers of firms with more tangible 
assets will prefer to issue debt than equity. This is because the tangible assets are more 
sensitive to informational asymmetries, have greater value in the event of bankruptcy, 
and the moral hazard risks decreasing when the company offers tangible assets as 
collateral for the investor, so the relation between debt and tangibility of assets should 
be positive  (Gaud, et al., 2005). 
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The positive relation between leverage and tangible of assets is supported by 
many previous empirical studies (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Titman & Wessels, 1988; 
Gaud, et al., 2005; Frank & Goyal, 2009 and Akdal, 2010).  
Thus, the hypothesis under study is as follows: 
 H1: Tangibility is positively correlated with debt. 
Profitability 
There are theoretical conflicts about the impact that profitability has in capital 
structure decisions of companies. For Myers & Majluf (1984) there is a negative 
relation between profitability and leverage. This is because the managers prefer internal 
funds to the external ones, so the most profitable firms should have more retain 
earnings, what means that, under the pecking order theory, the most profitable firms are 
less indebtedness, because have more internal funds to finance their projects.  
The trade-off theory explores capital structure by balancing the benefits of tax 
against the costs of financial distress. For Frank & Goyal (2009) the most profitable 
firms should use more debt because for those companies interest tax shields are more 
valuable and those companies face lower costs of financial distress. This means that, for 
this theory, the expected relation between profitability and debt should be positive. 
Additionally, Gaud, et al. (2005) noted that “if past profitability is a good proxy for 
future profitability, profitable firms can borrow more as the likelihood of paying back 
the loans is greater”. 
The empirical studies provided by Rajan & Zingales (1995) and Gaud, et al. 
(2005) support the pecking order theory perspective, high profitable firms have less debt 
in their capital structure because they prefer to use internal funds than debt or equity. 
Thus, the hypothesis under study is as follows: 
H2: Profitability is negatively correlated with debt. 
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Firm size 
The dimension of the firm is another determinant that previous literature argues 
that affect capital structure.  
In the trade-off perspective firm size have a positive relation with leverage. Frank 
& Goyal (2009) argue that larger and more mature firms are more diversified and face a 
lower default risk, so it is expected that they have more debt in their capital structure. 
For Rajan & Zingales (1995) the relationship between firm size and debt is ambiguous. 
This is because, larger firms are more diversified and so the probability of bankruptcy is 
lower, what meaning that size has a positive impact on leverage. Nevertheless, and in 
the pecking order perspective, in larger firms is also expected that the outsiders 
investors are better informed, which increases the preference for issue equity instead of 
debt for the managers of those firms.  
In Graham, et al. (1998) empirical work the results allow to conclude that firm 
size should predict more debt in capital structure. The authors state that this is due to the 
fact that larger firms are more stable, or less volatile, the cash-flows are more 
diversified and can exploit scale economies in issuing securities. Instead, the smaller 
firms, because of the information asymmetries and the higher cost for obtaining external 
funds, should be less leveraged.  
For Titman & Wessels (1988) small firms should be more leveraged than large 
ones, and should issue short-term debt instead long term debt. The justification is that 
small firms pay much more to issue new equity and long-term debt, so the short-term 
debt is the best alternative for small firms because of the lower fixed costs of this 
alternative. In the empirical work, these authors find a negative relation between short-
term debt and firm size, which supports their arguments about the impact of firm size in 
the capital structure. 
In their empirical work Akdal (2010), Baker & Wurgler (2002) and Sayilgan, et 
al. (2011) found that firm size affects positively the level of debt. Rajan & Zingales 
(1995) state that the effect of size on debt is unclear, despite that, except for Germany, 
the others countries exhibit a positive relationship between the two variables.  
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Thus, the hypothesis under study is as follows: 
H3: Firm size is positively correlated with debt. 
Growth opportunities 
Myers (1977) state that the most profitable firms are more likely to discards 
profitable investments opportunities. For Rajan & Zingales (1995) the companies that 
expect high future growth should issue equity rather than debt, to finance their 
investments. 
For the trade-off perspective, growth is negatively correlated with leverage 
because growing companies believe that their manoeuvrability is limited when use debt 
to finance their investments. And otherwise, creditors also don’t like to lend to growing 
companies because these firms undertake a lot of risk projects and so the bankruptcy 
risks are higher (Cortez & Susanto, 2012). 
Under the pecking order theory, firms with more investments, or growth 
opportunities, should accumulate more debt over time, because they need larger 
amounts of funds (Frank & Goyal, 2009). Gaud, et al. (2005) state that for those firms 
with strong financing needs, it is important to have a close relationship with banks, 
because this relation decreases informational asymmetry problems and they will be able 
to have access to debt financing more easily. 
As a proxy for growth opportunities, the market-to-book ratio is the instrument 
most commonly used as we can see in Baker & Wurgler (2002), Rajan & Zingales 
(1995) and Frank & Goyal (2009) works about capital structure. 
The market timing theory state that a company with a high market-to-book ratio 
should reduce leverage to exploit equity mispricing through equity issuances (Frank & 
Goyal, 2009). Baker & Wurgler (2002) conclude that companies tend to use equity 
instead of debt when their market valuation is high, and tend to repurchase equity when 
their market value is low. Through empirical analysis, the authors conclude that the 
market-to-book ratio, a proxy for growth opportunities, is negatively correlated with 
leverage.  
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For Rajan & Zingales (1995) this negative correlation between growth and debt is 
driven by firms with high market-to-book ratios, because are those companies tend to 
issue shares when their stock price is high relative to earnings or book value. This 
implies that such correlation is driven by companies who issue high amount of equity, 
i.e., those that have high market-to-book ratios. 
Thus, the hypothesis under study is as follows: 
H4: Growth opportunities are negatively correlated with debt. 
Non-debt tax shield 
Interest tax shields are not the only way for decreasing corporate tax burdens. For 
example tax deductions for depreciations and investments tax credits are alternatives for 
the tax benefits of debt financing (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980). 
The trade-off theory predicts that non-debt tax shields and leverage are negatively 
correlated, because to take benefits of higher tax shields, companies will issue more 
debt when tax rates are higher (Frank & Goyal, 2009). For Cortez & Susanto (2012) 
non-debt tax shields given by depreciation expense could be a substitute for debt tax 
shield, so the tax reducing property from debt is no longer needed.  
Titman & Wessels (1988) could not confirm the significance of the effect of non-
debt tax shields on the debt level of the companies. And, some literature finds an 
inverse relation between the two variables. Bradley, et al. (1984) found a positive 
relation between leverage and non-debt tax shields, suggesting that firms that invest 
severely in tangible assets, and so generate greater levels of depreciation and tax credits, 
tend to have higher levels of debt in capital structure. Graham (2005) has an explanation 
for this positive relation. He argues that the use of depreciation and investment tax 
credits, as a form of non-debt tax shields may be unwise because these variables are 
positively correlated with profitability and investment. What happens is that profitable 
firms invest heavily and also borrow to finance those investments. Certainly, this will 
induce a positive correlation between leverage and non-debt tax shields.  
According to the theory and the empirical results of DeAngelo & Masulis (1980), 
Cortez & Susanto (2012) and Miguel & Pindado (2001), for example, we can say that it 
is expected that non-debt tax shields impact negatively firms’ debt. 
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Thus, the hypothesis under study is as follows: 
H5: Non-debt tax shields are negatively correlated with debt. 
3.2 Variables 
In this study, the dependent variables are the firms’ debt. Many ratios of debt 
were used in the previous literature to investigate the relationship between capital 
structure and the firms’ characteristics. For example, the dependent variable in the work 
of Rajan & Zingales (1995) is expressed as the ratio of total debt to net assets, in which 
the net assets are stated as the total assets less accounts payable and other liabilities. 
Cortez & Susanto (2012) used the leverage, the ratio of total debt divided by total 
equity, like Sayilgan, et al. (2011) used to measure the financial leverage. 
Many other authors used more than one ratio to measure the corporate debt in the 
same investigation. For example, Chen (2004) measure debt as the ratio of book value 
of total debt divided by total assets, and the ratio of book value of long term debt 
divided by total assets. Frank & Goyal (2003) defined leverage as the ratio of total debt 
or long term debt divided by the book value of assets or the market value of assets (four 
measures). Titman & Wessels (1988), initially, have used six measures of financial 
leverage, the long term, short term and the convertible debt divided by the market and 
the book values of equity. But the data constraints forced them to measure the debt only 
in terms of book values.  
In this study, we use two dependent variables and they are measured as the ratio 
of total debt divided by the book value of total assets and as the ratio of long term debt 
divided by the book value of total assets. The use of two variables allow us testing the 
models’ sensitivity to the use of debt with different maturities considering that some 
firms make heavier use of short term debt in their capital structure, Cortez & Susanto 
(2012). 
TDEBTi,t = Total Debti,t / Book Value of Total Assetsi,t , firm i in year t 
LDEBTi,t = Long Term Debti,t / Book Value of Total Assetsi,t , firm i in year t 
The focus in the book values rather than the market values of assets is because as 
stated by Titman & Wessels (1988), in reference to Bowman (1980), the cross-sectional 
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correlation between the market and the values of indebtedness is large. So the 
misspecification of using book values rather than market values of assets is 
insignificant. 
Several determinants of firms’ capital structure were analysed in the previous 
literature. In this study were selected five determinants that those studies concluded that 
affect the capital structure of firms. They are as follows: tangibility of assets, 
profitability, firm size, growth opportunities and non-debt tax shields. The classification 
of these independent variables is provided below. 
Tangibility of assets 
In order to test de first hypothesis of this study, the tangibility of assets [TANG] 
is measure as the ratio of tangible fixed assets divided by total assets in consistent with 
the ratios used by Rajan & Zingales (1995), Akdal (2010) and Cortez & Susanto (2012).  
TANGi,t = Tangible Fixed Assetsi,t / Total Assetsi,t , of the firm i in year t 
Profitability 
Various proxies could be used to measure firms’ profitability. For example, 
Titman & Wessels (1988) employed as a measure of profitability the ratios of operating 
earnings over sales and operating earnings over total assets. Others authors, used the 
ratio of earnings before interest, tax and depreciation (EBITDA) divided by total assets 
(Gaud, et al., 2005; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Cortez & Susanto, 2012). 
In this work, it will be used the return on total assets (ROA) as measured of 
profitability [PROF], which is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax 
(EBIT) divided by total assets (Chen, 2004; Frank & Goyal, 2009; Akdal, 2010; 
Sayilgan, et al., 2011). 
PROFi,t = EBITi,t / Total Assetsi,t , of the firm i in year t 
Firm size 
To represent the firm’ size, the previous literature have been used different 
indicators, like the natural logarithm of total assets (Chen, 2004 and Frank & Goyal, 
2003), the natural logarithm of the total revenues (Cortez & Susanto, 2012) and the 
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natural logarithm of net sales (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Titman & Wessels, 1988 and 
Gaud, et al., 2005). In present study, the firm size [SIZE] is measure as the natural 
logarithm of net sales. 
SIZEi,t = Log Net Salesi,t , of the firm i in year t 
Growth opportunities 
Many different measures have been used in the literature as a proxy for growth 
opportunities. For example, Titman & Wessels (1988) used the capital expenditures 
over total assets, the percentage change in total assets and the research and development 
expenditures over sales, as indicator of firms’ growth opportunities. 
The most commonly ratio used as a proxy for growth opportunities is the market-
to-book ratio, as we can see in the works of Baker & Wurgler (2002), Rajan & Zingales 
(1995) and Frank & Goyal (2009). 
So in this study, growth opportunity [GROW] is measure as a ratio of market 
value of equity to the book value (Market-to-book ratio). 
GROWi,t = Market Value of Equityi,t / Book Value of Equityi,t , of the firm i in 
year t 
Non-debt tax shields 
As a measure of non-debt tax shields [NDTS], most of the literature uses the 
depreciation and amortisation expenses divided by total assets (Titman & Wessels, 
1988; Chen, 2004 and Cortez & Susanto, 2012). Titman & Wessels (1988) also have as 
indicator of the non-debt tax shields two more ratios: the investment tax credits over 
total assets and the direct estimate of non-debt tax shields over total assets. 
In the present study, the ratio used is the total depreciation and amortisation 
expenses divided by total assets 
NDTSi,t = Total Depreciation and Amortisation Expensesi,t / Total Assetsi,t , of 
the firm i in year t 
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Table 1: The definition of the independent variables and expected signs 
 
3.3 Sample 
The main objectives of this study is examine what French firms’ characteristics 
affect their managers’ decisions about the capital structure, and understand what theory 
better explains those decisions. To achieve these purposes we select a sample of 
companies listed in the Euronext Paris. The financial and market information relative to 
those firms was extracted from Amadeus database.  
It is worth noting that initially the objective of the work was to study Portuguese 
firms, but given the small dimension of the Portuguese market we decided to analyse a 
market in the Eurozone with a higher number of firm-year observations. We do not 
select the entire European Union, or a sample including more than one country, because 
in the previous literature has been developed the argument that countries’ specific 
factors can make comparability difficult. Thus, after testing several countries, we select 
France, because it is the country with the larger number of firm-year observations in the 
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Considering the entire universe of 
French firms, we chose the subset of non-financial listed companies, so that their 
financial results and reporting disclosure can be compared with those of the listed 
companies in the other countries namely in the European Union. 
From the initial sample have been removed the firms that failed to have complete 
information for at least five consecutive years and, also, companies that report negative 
Variable Definition
Trade-off 
theory
Pecking 
order theory
Market 
timing theory
Expected 
sign
TANG
Tangible Fixed Assets / Total 
Assets
+ + +
PROF EBIT / Total Assets + - -
SIZE Log Net Sales + +
GROW
Market Value of Equity / Book 
Value of Equity
- + - -
NDTS
Total Depreciation and 
Amortisation Expenses / Total 
Assets
- -
(-) Negative sign indicates a negative relationship between the variable and debt
(+) Positive sign indicates a positive relationship between the variable and debt
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accounting equity for at least one year. Finally, were excluded from the sample the 5% 
largest and smallest companies, to eliminate outliers. 
Thus, the final sample is composed by 436 companies for the years since 2007 to 
2013 (3052 firm-year observations).  
As regards the sample period, we choose the sampling period beginning in 2007 
because, in the European Union, in 2005 all listed companies were required to adopt the 
IFRS standards and if we choose data before this year our results could be impacted by 
this change. Additionally, in the Amadeus database for 2005 and 2006 there are many 
missing observations, so we decided to initiate our sample period in 2007 and end it in 
2013, which was the last year with available information. 
Amadeus’ database do not have information for companies in the financial and 
insurance sectors, because their capital structure is subject to regulatory norms and 
prudential rules, so it was not be necessary to remove this type of entities from our 
sample.  
3.4 Methodology 
The sample contains data across firms and over time, so our sample is structure in 
panel data. Some of previous research argues that estimations based on panel data have 
some advantages relative to those based on cross-sectional or time series data. For 
example, because the panel data involve at least two dimensions leads to a greater 
number of observations in regression estimations. The fact that panel data usually 
contain more degrees of freedom and more sample variability the efficiencies of 
econometric estimates increase, that is, the accuracy of the estimators is higher, than 
with cross-sectional data or time series data. Other advantage of panel data is that 
allows controlling the impact of omitted variables, for the fact that have information for 
both the intertemporal dynamics and the individuality of the entities. The unobserved 
variables can lead to seriously biased inference, so the panel data mitigate endogeneity 
problems related to omitted variables. 
The general estimating equation could be written as follows: 
Yi,t =  β0 + β1 X1,t + β2 X2,t + β3 X3,t + … + βi Xi,t + ei,t 
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Where: 
Yi,t – represents the dependent variable; 
X1,t, X2,t, X3,t , … , Xi,t – represents the independent variables; 
β0, β1, β2, β3, … , βi - represents the regression coefficients; 
ei,t – represents the error of the model, disturbance term. 
The method used to estimate the regressions are ordinary least squares (OLS). 
Initially we estimate the following regressions: 
TDEBTi,t = β0 + β1 TANGi,t + β2 PROFi,t + β3 SIZEi,t + β4 GROWi,t + β5 NDTSi,t + ei,t 
LDEBTi,t = β0 + β1 TANGi,t + β2 PROFi,t + β3 SIZEi,t + β4 GROWi,t + β5 NDTSi,t + ei,t 
For example, with the previous estimation of the first equation, with no effects 
specification, the determination coefficient (R
2
) was 18.96%, that represents the 
explanatory capacity of the model, and the variables Tangibility of assets (TANG), 
Profitability (PROF), Firm size(SIZE) and Growth opportunities (GROW) were 
significant.  
To analyse the time series effects we decide introduce six year dummy variables 
to test differences in intercept terms or slope coefficients between periods. With this 
change we can conclude that the dummies are significant in 2011, 2012 and 2013, and 
in these years the debt decreases relatively to 2007, probably because of the economic 
crisis. Our R
2 
is now 19.30%, a little higher than the previous. The estimation with the 
year dummy variables or the estimation with year fixed effects have approximately the 
same results so we decide to estimate the regressions with time fixed effects using the 
year dummy variables, because these variables allows to analyse whether debt levels 
varied from year to year due to different reasons than the givens by the explanatory 
variables (other external factors can affect the firms debt level, like for example the 
economic crisis). 
As regards to cross-section effects, to decide between using fixed effects or 
random effects, we run the Hausman test. The null hypothesis was rejected at 1% level, 
so we can conclude that the random effects model is not appropriate and the fixed 
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effects model must be used. With the introduction of the cross-section fixed effects the 
explanatory capacity of the model increase, the R
2
 rose from 19.30% to 89.28%. 
We also had the concern to study the impact of the heteroscedasticity in the 
model, in order to know if the use of the White heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
is applicable. So, we run the Breusch-Pagan test, using the initial data without the panel 
data structure. The test allowed reject that the conditional variance of the error term is 
constant. Therefore, we estimate the equation using the White cross-section coefficient 
covariance method and we conclude that the introduction of the White 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors do not improve the estimation. Given that we 
kept the estimation with the ordinary coefficients.   
Under the previous conclusions, the panel data regressions used to the research 
hypothesis will take the following forms: 
(1) TDEBTi,t = β0 + β1 Y8i,2008 + β2 Y9i,2009 + β3 Y10i,2010 + β4 Y11i,2011 + β5 Y12i,2012 + β6 
Y13i,2013 + β7 TANGi,t + β8 PROFi,t + β9 SIZEi,t + β10 GROWi,t + β11 NDTSi,t + ei,t 
(2) LDEBTi,t = β0 + β1 Y8i,2008 + β2 Y9i,2009 + β3 Y10i,2010 + β4 Y11i,2011 + β5 Y12i,2012 + β6 
Y13i,2013 + β7 TANGi,t + β8 PROFi,t + β9 SIZEi,t + β10 GROWi,t + β11 NDTSi,t + ei,t 
In the previous regressions, i refers to firm (Panel variable: Companies) and t to 
time (Time variable: Year). 
The regressions are used to determine the type of relationship between the 
determinants of capital structure and the firms’ leverage. The hypotheses under study is 
confirmed when the explanatory variable in question is statistically significant and the 
sign is in accordance with the theoretical formulation. 
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4. Empirical results and Discussion 
In this chapter we present and discuss the empirical results of the study. Initially 
in the section 4.1, univariate analysis, we proceed with the analysis of the descriptive 
statistics and the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables used in the 
regressions. In the section 4.2, multivariate analysis, we analyse the regression results 
in the context of the theories discussed above about the capital structure of the firm, 
namely the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory and the market timing theory. 
4.1 Univariate Analysis 
In the table 2 are presented the descriptive statistics (Mean, Median, Standard 
Derivation, Maximum value, Minimum value and Number of observations) for the 
years from 2007 to 2013 for the dependent variables (Total debt and Long-term debt) 
and for the explanatory variables (Tangibility, Profitability, Size, Growth opportunities 
and Non-debt tax shields) use in the equations (1) and (2). 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Regarding the dependent variables, in average the ratio of total debt is 20.84% 
and the ratio of long-term debt is 13.34%. That means that on average, in French non-
financial listed firms, the borrowed funds do not have a significant burden in the total of 
shareholder funds and liabilities of the company. It should be noted that, in the sample 
we have companies that have no debt in their structures, because in the table 2 the total 
debt presents a minimum value of zero. 
Concerning the independent variables, the volatility of Tangibility, Growth 
opportunities and Non-debt tax shields is slightly high because the standard derivation 
Mean Median
Standard 
Derivation
Maximum Minimum Observations
TDEBT 0.208428 0.183777 0.161139 0.806099 0.000000 3052
LDEBT 0.133350 0.090911 0.141861 0.859998 0.000000 3016
TANG 0.170450 0.095793 0.189349 0.993385 0.000000 3023
PROF 0.093518 0.093154 0.092032 0.689476 -0.620351 2998
SIZE 8.180535 8.123404 0.890435 10.331910 4.623249 3025
GROW 0.070048 0.048580 0.082256 2.184038 0.002507 3007
NDTS 0.040820 0.030558 0.063177 2.389654 -0.081514 2998
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is greater than the mean of the variables. Nevertheless, the independent variables 
Profitability and Size have a lower volatility. 
It should be noted that to avoid biased data all the explanatory variables are 
linearized.  The variables Tangibility, Profitability, Growth opportunities and Non-debt 
tax shields are ratios whose denominator is total assets. As regards to the variable Size 
we use the natural logarithm of sales. 
In the table 3 is presented the correlation matrix between the explanatory 
variables used in equations (1) and (2). 
Table 3: Pearson correlation coefficients between variables 
 
As can be seen in the table 3 the correlations between the independent variables 
are quite small showing that there are no expected problems of collinearity in the 
estimations. When the correlation coefficients are less than 0.3 we do not expect to have 
collinearity problems (Aivazian, et al., 2005).  
4.2 Multivariate Results  
The main objective of this paper is to identify the determinants of the companies 
that affect their capital structure, in particular for non-financial French companies listed 
in the Euronext Paris, during the years since 2007 to 2013. For this purpose, we proceed 
to the estimation of the regressions (1) and (2). The results of this estimation are 
presented in the table 4 below. 
The estimation of the panel data regression has been carried out using the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, with cross-section fixed effects and year 
dummy variables.  To study the relevance of the models in explaining the dependent 
variables we analyse the F-statistic that presents the values 47.2178 and 36.4256, 
respectively for the equations (1) and (2), what means that at the 1% significance level 
TANG PROF SIZE GROW NDTS
TANG 1.000000 * * * *
PROF 0.110205 1.000000 * * *
SIZE 0.124607 0.174553 1.000000 * *
GROW -0.045985 0.199840 -0.127441 1.000000 *
NDTS 0.164609 0.286724 -0.028031 -0.014040 1.000000
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the independent variables affect the debt level, i.e., the models have explanatory 
capacity. So we can conclude by the relevance of both models. 
The determination coefficient (R
2
), which measures the adjustment quality of the 
regression model to the data, is about 89.28% and 86.53%, respectively for equations 
(1) and (2). This means that the models (1) and (2) have an explanatory capacity of 
about 89.28% and 86.53%, respectively, of the variation of the debt level. 
In the results present in the table 4 we can see that when the dependent variable is 
the Total Debt (TDEBT) all explanatory variables are significant at 1% level. When the 
dependent variable is the Long-term Debt (LDEBT) the variables Growth opportunities 
(GROW) and Non-debt tax shields (NDTS) lose their significance, but the remaining 
variables are significant at 1% level. 
As expected by the trade-off theory and by the pecking order theory the variable 
Tangibility of assets (TANG) presents a positive sign in both equations, meaning that 
the firms that have more tangible assets tend to be more leverage, given that, the 
tangible assets can be used to collateralize loans (Titman & Wessels, 1988). In the first 
equation, if the firms’ tangible assets increase by 1% then total debt increases 9.32‰. In 
case of long-term debt it increases 6.66‰ if the tangible assets increase 1%. In 
conclusion, the tangibility of assets has a significant and positive impact in firms’ debt 
level, as stated by the trade-off theory and by the pecking order theory. This 
relationship supports Hypothesis 1. 
The variable Profitability (PROF) is significant and presents a negative sign in 
both equations, as expected by the pecking order theory. This is explained by previous 
authors, and particularly by Myers & Majluf (1984), because the more profitable firms 
have more internal funds to finance their investments, and managers always prefer 
internal funds to external ones, so the most profitable firms should be less indebted, 
because they have more internal funds to finance themselves. In the particular case of 
French firms, we can see that when the variable PROF increases 1%, TDBET decreases 
about 23.00‰ and LDEBT decreases about 10.89‰. In conclusion, the profitability has 
a significant and negative impact in the debt level of the firms, as stated by the pecking 
order theory. This relationship supports Hypothesis 2. 
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Table 4: Panel data regression coefficients 
 
Independent 
Variables
TDEBT
(1)
LDEBT
(2)
β0
-0.1951 **
(-2.4555)
-0.1739 **
(-2.2330)
Y08
0.0112 ***
(2.6946)
0.0063
(1.5527)
Y09
0.0053
(1.3053)
0.0087 **
(2.1895)
Y10
-0.0087 **
(-2.1459)
-0.0012
(-0.3001)
Y11
-0.0155 ***
(-3.7570)
-0.0080 **
(-1.9738)
Y12
-0.0187 ***
(-4.4475)
-0.0067
(-1.6391)
Y13
-0.0131 ***
(-3.1025)
-0.0063
(-1.5235)
TANG
0.0932 ***
(4.0363)
0.0666 ***
(2.9459)
PROF
-0.23001 ***
(-10.3439)
-0.1089 ***
(-4.9932)
SIZE
0.0505 ***
(5.17647)
0.0376 ***
(3.9333)
GROW
-0.0708 ***
(-2.8119)
-0.0265
(-1.0731)
NDTS
0.1466 ***
(3.3073)
0.0170
(0.3915)
Number of observations 2975 2975
R
2 0.8928 0.8653
Adjusted R-squared 0.8739 0.8416
F-statistic 47.2179 *** 36.4256 ***
Note: This table summarizes the results of OLS estimation of panel data regressions, estimated for 436
French companies during the 2007-2013 sample period. Coefficient values are reported as percentages
with t-statistics at the second row. The dependent variables are TDEBT and LDEBT. TDEBT=Total debt
divided by book value of total assets. LDEBT=Long-term debt divided by book value of total assets.
TANG=Tangible fixed assets divided by total assets. PROF=EBIT divided by total assets. SIZE=Natural
logarithm of net sales. GROW= Maker value of equity divided by the book value of equity.
NDTS=Depreciation and amortisation expenses divided by the total assets. The two equations include
year dummies variables. *, ** and *** denote coefficients significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
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As expected by the trade-off theory, the variable firm size (SIZE) has a 
significant and positive impact in the firms’ leverage. In the first equation, if the firm’ 
size increase 1% the total debt should increases 5.05‰, and, in case of long-term debt, 
it should increases 3.76‰. This impact in firms’ leverage is explained by Frank & 
Goyal (2009) because the largest and more mature firms are more diversified and face a 
lower default risk, so it is expected that they have more debt in their capital structure, 
relatively to small companies that pay much more by issuing new equity and for long-
term debt, so short-term debt is the best alternative for small firms because of the lower 
fixed costs of this alternative (Titman & Wessels, 1988). In conclusion, the firm size has 
a significant and positive impact in firms’ debt level, as stated by the trade-off theory. 
This relationship supports Hypothesis 3. 
The variable Growth Opportunities (GROW) is significant only in the equation 
(1). In this equation, GROW has a significant and negative impact, when this variable 
increases 1% the total debt decreases 7.08‰. Relative to the long-term debt, the 
variable GROW also has a negative impact, but it is not statistically significant. This 
negative relation is consistent with the Market timing theory that states that companies 
tend to issue equity instead of debt when their market valuation is high (when the 
variable GROW increases, given that this variable represent the market-to-book ratio), 
and tend to repurchase equity when their market value is low (Baker & Wurgler, 2002). 
Those authors also concluded that the market-to-book ratio, a proxy for growth, is 
negatively correlated with leverage. In conclusion, the growth opportunity has a 
significant and negative impact in firms’ total debt level, as stated by the market timing 
theory. This relationship supports Hypothesis 4. 
Unexpectedly, the variable Non-debt tax shields (NDTS) has a positive and 
significant impact in the total firm debt level. For the long-term debt, the variable also 
presents a positive impact, but statistically is not significant. In the first equation, when 
the NDTS increases 1% the total debt should increase 14.66‰. The trade-off theory 
predicts that non-debt tax shields and leverage should be negatively correlated, because 
non-debt tax shields given by depreciation expense could be a substitute for debt tax 
shield, so the tax reduction given by debt is no longer needed (Cortez & Susanto, 2012). 
Nevertheless, the relation obtained from the equation is positive and is explained by 
Bradley, et al. (1984) because the firms that invest heavily in tangible assets, and thus 
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generate higher levels of depreciation and tax credits, tend to have higher levels of debt 
in capital structure, since they need resources to finance these investments. Also 
Graham (2005) argues that use of depreciation and investment tax credits, as a form of 
non-debt tax shields may be unwise because these variables are positively correlated 
with the profitability and the investment; those profitable firms invest heavily and also 
borrow to finance those investments. In conclusion, the non-debt tax shields have a 
significant and positive impact in firms’ total debt level, in opposite with the predicted 
by the trade-off theory, so we have to reject the Hypothesis 5. 
From this study we can conclude that we have not a leading theory that can 
explain the firms’ decisions about its capital structure, because depending on the 
variable the relationship is supported by a different theory. What can be concluded is 
that the trade-off theory can explain the relationship between the Tangibility of assets 
and Debt and between the Firm size and Debt. The Pecking order theory can explain the 
relationship between the Profitability of the company and the level of debt in its capital 
structure. Finally, the Market timing theory can explain the relationship between the 
Growth opportunities of firm and the Leverage. The relationship between the Non-debt 
tax shield and Debt is not explained by any of those three theories. 
With the introduction of the year dummy variables we are able to analyse 
whether debt levels vary from one year to another due to different reasons than those 
represented by the five explanatory variables.  
In the equation (1) we can see that only the year dummy Y09 is not significant. 
The dummy Y08 is positive and statistically significant, what means that comparing 
with 2007 in 2008 the level of total debt increases in non-financial listed French firms. 
The dummies Y10, Y11, Y12 and Y13 are statistically significant and present a 
negative sign, meaning that in those years the total debt decreases comparing with 2007. 
These results show a turning point in the evolution of total debt, maybe triggered by 
financial and economic crisis. Before the economic crisis the debt increases relative to 
the previous year and after the economic crisis (in this case from 2010 to 2013) the debt 
level of the firms decreases comparing with previous years. 
In the equation (2) only the 2009 and 2011 year dummy variables are significant. 
The first have a positive sign and the second one a negative sign, i.e., in 2009 the long-
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term debt level increase comparing with 2007 and in 2011 the long-term debt level 
decrease comparing with the same year, for French non-financial listed companies. 
With these regression results we cannot set a standard for the evolution of the debt. 
 
4.2.1 Financial Crisis 
Given that in the period since 2007 to 2013 the world went through a financial 
and economic crisis, it is interesting to study if the variables presented above suffered 
any change in the impact that they have in the firms’ capital structure. To achieve this 
purpose, the sample was split in two periods, the period before the financial crisis (2007 
to 2008) and the period during the financial crisis (2009 to 2013). The table 5 below 
present the empirical results. 
From these results, we can highlight that before the financial crisis the variable 
Tangibility of assets had a negative and significant impact, and this impact become 
positive and also significant after the financial crisis. This represents the fact that, for 
lenders, especially after the financial crisis, the tangible assets are a very important 
guarantee for loans. So the firms that did not have those guarantees have more difficulty 
to obtain loans.  
The other variables do not have a significant change that enable us to conclude 
that the behaviour changes after the economic and financial crisis.  
Once more is very interesting analyse the results given by the year dummy 
variables. In the both cases, for total debt and for long-term debt, before the financial 
crisis, the year dummy Y08 is not statistically significant, but is positive, which would 
mean that in 2008 the debt level increase comparing to 2007. In the regressions after the 
financial crisis, both for total debt and for long-term debt, all the year dummies are 
negative and statistically significant. This means that after the financial crisis, debt level 
of the firms starts to decrease due to different reasons than the given by the five 
explanatory variables. One of these reasons certainly is the economic and financial 
crisis that the Europe crossed in the last years. It is also interesting to note that this 
negative impact in debt level from 2010 to 2012 increase. In 2013 this impact is also 
negative but this negative impact starts to decrease, which may represent the beginning 
of the end of the economic crisis. 
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Table 5: French financial crises 
  
 
 
2007-2008
(1)
2009-2013
(2)
2007-2008
(3)
2009-2013
(4)
β0
-0.7260 ***
(-3.0695)
-0.1641
(-1.6164)
-0.4821 **
(-2.0736)
-0.1055
(-1.0068)
Y08
0.0103
(2.4400)
-
0.0043
(1.0360)
-
Y10 -
-0.0142 ***
(-4.0630)
-
-0.0097 ***
(-2.6904)
Y11 -
-0.0210 ***
(-5.8861)
-
-0.016 ***
(-4.4343)
Y12 -
-0.0239 ***
(-6.5533)
-
-0.0149 ***
(-3.9537)
Y13 -
-0.0185 ***
(-4.9563)
-
-0.0145 ***
(-3.7788)
TANG
-0.3094 ***
(-3.5227)
0.1295 ***
(4.7897)
-0.2151 **
(-2.4967)
0.1074 ***
(3.8507)
PROF
-0.4012 ***
(-7.5990)
-0.1906 ***
(-7.5743)
-0.2897 ***
(-5.5939)
-0.0833 ***
(-3.2092)
SIZE
0.1253 ***
(4.4338)
0.0461 ***
(3.6959)
0.0835 **
(3.0112)
0.0280 **
(2.2524)
GROW
-0.0271
(-0.5023)
-0.0865 ***
(-3.1495)
-0.0291
(-0.5496)
-0.0433
(-1.523)
NDTS
0.1934 **
(2.0076)
0.2088 ***
(3.8940)
0.0906
(0.9589)
0.0870
(1.5723)
Number of observations 839 2136 839 2136
R
2 0.9636 0.9211 0.9554 0.8891
Adjusted R-squared 0.9246 0.9004 0.9076 0.8600
F-statistic 24.7349 *** 44.4887 *** 20.0179 *** 30.5298 ***
Independent 
Variables
TDEBT LDEBT
Note: This table summarizes the results of OLS estimation of panel data regressions, estimated for 436 French
companies during the 2007-2013 sample period. Coefficient values are reported as percentages with t-statistics at the
second row. The dependent variables are TDEBT and LDEBT. TDEBT=Total debt divided by book value of total
assets. LDEBT=Long-term debt divided by book value of total assets. TANG=Tangible fixed assets divided by total
assets. PROF=EBIT divided by total assets. SIZE=Natural logarithm of net sales. GROW= Maker value of equity
divided by the book value of equity. NDTS=Depreciation and amortisation expenses divided by the total assets. The
two equations include year dummies variables. *, ** and *** denote coefficients significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
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5. Conclusions 
After the seminal work of Modigliani e Miller (1958), which states that capital 
structure is irrelevant for both the cost of capital and firm value, many other studies 
have analysed the characteristics of companies that affect the decisions of manager 
about the firms’ capital structure.  Models of trade-off study capitals structure by 
balancing the benefit of tax against the cost of financial distress, Kraus and Litzenberger 
(1973), and against agency costs, Jensen and Meckling (1976). Another of research 
argues that there is a pecking order among financing sources, Myers and Majluf (1984). 
Finally, a different body of literature, which is known as  market timing theory, suggests 
that firms issue shares when the market is high and repurchases when the market is low, 
Baker and Wurgler (2002). 
The aim of this paper is to understand which characteristics of French non-
financial listed firms affect the decisions taken by managers about how to finance their 
investments and projects (internal or external funds; short, medium or long term 
resources) and thus in this way affect the company capital structure. Other purpose of 
the paper is investigate what theory among the three presented in the paper (Trade-off 
theory, Pecking order theory or Market timing theory) can explain the capital structure 
of firms, given their characteristics.  
To achieve the aim of the paper we chose the following explanatory variables, 
which are consistent with the previous literature: tangibility of assets, profitability, firm 
size, growth opportunities and non-debt tax shields. As dependent variables are used the 
Total Debt and the Long-term Debt. The method used to estimate the regressions is 
ordinary least squares (OLS) with cross-section fixed effects and year dummy variables. 
The sample is composed by 436 French companies, listed in the Euronext Paris, for the 
years since 2007 to 2013 (3052 observations). Additionally, the data sample was 
subdivided into two periods (pre-crisis period, from 2007 to 2008 and post crisis period, 
from 2009 to 2013) to capture the effects of the financial and economic crisis in the 
firms’ determinants. 
The results obtained by the empirical work show that there is no a leading theory, 
that can explain the decisions taken by its managers about how to finance its 
investments and projects. We can highlight that the tangibility of assets and the firm 
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size have a positive impact in the firm’ leverage as predicted by the trade-off theory. As 
stated by the pecking order theory the profitability are negatively correlated with debt 
and firm’ growth opportunities are also negatively correlated with leverage, as predicted 
by the market timing theory. When the sample is split to analyse the impact of financial 
and economic crisis in the characteristics of the firm, we can highlight that before the 
crisis the variable tangibility presents a negative relation with debt and this relation 
changes to positive after the crisis. This represents the fact that, for lenders, especially 
after the financial crisis, the tangible assets are a very important guarantee for the loan. 
With the empirical results, we cannot confirm only the hypothesis 5, all other 
hypothesis presented in chapter 3.1 are supported by the empirical results. 
With the introduction of the year dummy variables we were able to note that in 
the regressions, for the period after the financial crisis, all the year dummies are 
negative and statistically significant, what means that after the financial crisis, debt 
level of the firms starts to decrease due to different reasons than the given by the five 
explanatory variables. One of these reasons certainly is the economic and financial 
crisis that the Europe crossed in the last years. 
This research has some limitations: in first place we should take care when 
comparing this study with other ones, if the variables, the sample or the methodology 
are significantly different because in the previous literature has been developed the 
argument that countries’ specific factors can make comparability difficult; in second 
place although we only used five explanatory variables, which are the most used in the 
previous studies, though this last limitations our regression is enhanced as we use year 
dummy variables to understand the impact of the financial crisis on the level of 
indebtedness of firms. 
With the developing of these limitations, we can propose some future research. It 
would be interesting to include the impact of the liquidity of the firm and volatility of 
the EBITDA as explanatory variables of the regressions. 
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